"Failure is only the opportunity to begin again more intelligently." 1 -Henry Ford 2 3 How often have we heard that failure is a badge of honor for entrepreneurs? 1 That failure 4 is a precursor to success? That failure makes an entrepreneur more bankable because s/he learned 5 on other people's money? But do we really know about the role of failure, and how failure is 6 translated into future entrepreneurial success? How do entrepreneurs' reactions to failure impact 7 the performance of their subsequent ventures? The answer is that at this point we know very little. 8
Focusing on these crucial questions, we hope to shed some light on this important but 9 understudied aspect of entrepreneurship by examining the performance of new ventures started 10 after a prior entrepreneurial failure. 11
While most entrepreneurs hope to be successful, unfortunately, a majority of their 12 ventures end in failure (Knott & Posen, 2005; Peng et al., 2010) . Failure is a fundamental element 13 in entrepreneurship (Lee et al., 2007 (Lee et al., , 2011 McGrath, 1999; Shane, 2001 ), which to date has been 14 difficult to address empirically. Entrepreneurship researchers not only need to study success but 15 also failure, because failure can be a precursor of another emergence (Aldrich, 1999; Learned, 16 1999; McGrath, 1999) . Indeed, it is intriguing that some (but not all) entrepreneurs come back 17 from failure, and start up another business (Hayward et al., 2006) . Despite having been 18 unsuccessful in previous entrepreneurial efforts, many entrepreneurs re-launch businesses (Flores 19 & Blackburn, 2006) . However, as noted by Cardon and McGrath (1999) and Shepherd (2003) , 20 the impact of prior failure on future entrepreneurship has not received significant attention in the 21 literature. Shepherd, Covin, and Kuratko (2009a) To the extent that such research exists, studies have gravitated toward the theme of 5 learning from failure (Cope, 2011; Shepherd, 2003) , especially how some second-time (as 6 opposed to first-time) ventures lead to greater success (Kawakami 2007) . Failure can be an 7 important source for the development of knowledge and skills that can be highly useful in 8 subsequent venturing activities (Baron, 2004; McGrath, 1999; Minniti & Bygrave, 2001; Sitkin, 9 1992 ). Meanwhile, learning from failure is not automatic (Shepherd, 2003) . It does not occur in a 10 vacuum as experience of failure does not inevitably lead to future success (Green et al., 2003) . 11
There is heterogeneity in entrepreneurs' ability to maximize their learning from failure (Shepherd, 12 2003 ). However, "few have explored how entrepreneurs or communities make sense of venture 13 failures that do occur and the implications of such sensemaking for continued entrepreneurship" 14 (Cardon et al., 2010: 79) . Endeavoring to start filling in this gap, we focus on entrepreneurs ' 15 reaction to failure. Specifically, we investigate (1) how entrepreneurs' attribution of the cause of 16 failure plays a role in learning from the failure, (2) how their aspiration for future start-up plays a 17 role in persisting and overcoming the failure, and (3) how these attributions and motivations 18 impact future entrepreneurship in the form of venture growth. Instead of simply exploring 19 whether entrepreneurs rebound from failure and start another venture or how much they learn, we 20 find it critical to understand the impact of cognitive determinants on subsequent venture growth. 21 That is why we explore venture growth as our dependent variable. Moreover, we investigate (4) 22 how the extent of failure experiences moderates the relationships above to explore the boundary 23 conditions linking entrepreneurs' reaction to failure and subsequent performance. 24 experience of failure is associated with the growth of their subsequent ventures. Third, to the best 1 of our knowledge, the secondary survey database of new-venture founders with failure 2 experiences is one of the first databases of its type in the field that allows us to empirically 3 explore questions that have been immune to empirical exploration prior to our work. Last but not 4 least, our sample consists of entrepreneurs in Japan-a country where entrepreneurship is 5 desperately needed. Unfortunately, entrepreneurship research on Japan has been scarce (Bruton & 6 Lau, 2008). Our study captures entrepreneurs' opportunities to revitalize from prior failure for 7 future entrepreneurship that exist even in the harsh climate where the institutional environment is 8 hostile for individuals to embark on an entrepreneurial career, let alone a second chance of 9 coming back from a failure. The context is particularly suitable for understanding failure recovery. 10 In sum, we articulate the usefulness of cognitive factors that help explain the process linking 11 failure to recovery, learning, persistence, and subsequent venture growth, in a context where 12 entrepreneurship really matters. 13 
14

Main Hypotheses 15
Internal Attribution of Blame 16 According to social psychology theory, attributions are the mechanisms through which 17 individuals explain their own behavior, the actions of others, and events in the world (Martinko et attributions of causality (Ford, 1985) . Attribution regarding the cause of failure plays an 22 important role in understanding the impact of previous failure on future ventures (Wagner & 23 Gooding, 1997), in particular, the amount of learning from the failure (Sitkin, 1992) . 24 When entrepreneurs fail, different causal explanations are employed to account for what 1 went wrong. "Why did this happen?" "What might have been the cause?" These questions signal 2 the beginning of sensemaking-an interpretive process in which entrepreneurs assign meaning to 3 occurrences in conjunction with action (Bradley, 2002; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991) . 4 Understanding of events is structured through interpretation and sensemaking, which involves 5 retrospectively linking events to possible causes and attributing the causes (Ford, 1985) . Given 6 entrepreneurs' varying levels of reactions over failure (Yanchus et al., 2003) , there is also 7 heterogeneity in their ability to maximize the learning from failure (Shepherd, 2003) . That is why 8 attribution regarding the cause of failure can have critical implications for entrepreneurs ' 9 recovering, learning, and achieving success upon previous failures (Shepherd, 2009) . 10 An important aspect of the entrepreneurs' attribution of failure is the locus of causality, 11
whether an event is due to reasons internal to the person experiencing the event or to reasons 12 beyond their control (Cardon et al., 2010; Weiner, 1985) . Using this framework, we posit that The significance of locus of causality (in terms of learning) is that it implies the source of 19 a cause and where to apply corrective action (Ford, 1985) . Prior research in psychology has 20 established the link between internal attributions, motivation, and positive learning outcomes 21 (Weissbein et al., 2011) . Internal attribution of failure by entrepreneurs not motivated to try again 22 may lead them to conclude that they are not smart enough or good enough to do it and learn little 23 from failure. In the case of entrepreneurs who start again, internal attribution of blame is more 24 likely to be associated with effective post-failure learning since the actions of entrepreneurs are 1 identified as the cause of failure. This leads them to begin asking questions, such as "Where did I 2 go wrong?" and "What could I have done better?" This places the focus on their entrepreneurial 3 resources and capabilities and the areas in which they need to improve. Baron (2004) introduces 4 the concept of "counterfactual thinking" (the tendency to imagine different outcomes in a given 5 situation than what actually happened) as an important entrepreneurial capability. "What might 6 have been, if I…?" This is highly relevant because such thinking can have a profound effect on 7 entrepreneurs' understanding of cause-and-effect relationships, decision-making, and task 8 performance (Markman et al., 2002; Roese, 1997) . 9 We argue that counterfactual thinking is more likely to occur in the case of higher levels 10 of internal attribution of blame. Entrepreneurs who blame their failure internally are predisposed 11 to look back upon what they might have done wrong and consider how they might do better next 12 time, especially if they view the problem as correctable. Engaging in such counterfactual thinking 13 allows entrepreneurs to consider past failures in the process of constructing more effective 14 strategies that generate positive outcomes in the future. What entrepreneurs learn about 15 themselves from their reflection on internal attribution is more readily transferable and is more 16 likely to impact subsequent venture growth -as opposed to some venture-specific knowledge (i.e., 17 important determinant of success) that is likely to be associated with external attribution of failure 18 but less transferable and applicable to the new venture. "Learning from failure occurs when 19 individuals can use the information available about why the business failed to revise their existing 20 knowledge of how to manage their own business effectively-that is, to revise assumptions about 21 the consequences of previous assessments, decisions, actions, and inactions" (Shepherd, 2003: 22 320) . 23 In sum, successful entrepreneurs who recover effectively from failure may be those who 1 engage in counterfactual thinking, those who attribute the cause of their failure internally and 2 become adept at using such thinking to develop enhanced strategies in their subsequent endeavors. 3
As a result, entrepreneurs with previous failure experiences may profit more from past mistakes 4 (Baron, 2004; Sitkin, 1992) . 5
On the other hand, low levels or no internal attribution of blame may allow failed 6 entrepreneurs to reduce their sense of shame and guilt, in order to get back in the game. However, 7 this does not necessarily mean that they learned more and/or will perform better in the next round. (Katz & Gartner, 1988) . The founding entrepreneurs' intentions determine the direction of an 25 organization at its inception. Subsequent success and growth of the organization are based on 26 these intentions (Bird, 1988) . Of course, the entrepreneurial process occurs because entrepreneurs 1 actively choose to pursue opportunities (Baron, 2004; Shane et al., 2003) . Extending this line of 2 work, we argue that entrepreneurs' motivation is an integral part of their efforts to start up 3 another business after initial failure. Confident enactment based on intrinsic motivation may help create a positive reality as resource 2 providers are persuaded by the confidence and as the entrepreneur puts in more effort, feeling 3 more certain it will be rewarded (Gartner et al., 1992) . Hard work and the pursuit of success due 4 to intrinsic motivation is also much more enjoyable than slogging away at a job they dislike 5 (Hackman & Oldham, 1976) . In sum, intrinsic motivation "concerns active engagement with 6 tasks that people find interesting and that in turn promote growth" (Deci & Ryan, 2000: 233) . 7
On the other hand, low levels of or no intrinsic motivation (attributing the force of their 8 behaviors principally to extrinsic outcomes) often in the form of financial (monetary) rewards can 9 have a negative effect (Daniel & Esser, 1980; Sherman & Smith, 1984) . Accordingly, a change in 10 the perceived locus of causality such that when extrinsic financial rewards are made contingent 11 on entrepreneurs' behavior that are perceived by them, the locus of causality shifts from within 12 the individual to the extrinsic reward resulting in reduced intrinsic motivation. Extrinsic rewards 13 On the other hand, greater extent of failure experiences (e.g., further increase in the 5 number of failures) may not necessarily be associated with greater learning and subsequent 6 performance. Since each failure takes its toll on the reputation, morale, and sanity of the 7 entrepreneur, the loss of a business can generate a negative emotional response (e.g., grief) that 8 can interfere with individuals' ability to learn from the loss (Shepherd, 2003) . Numerous failure 9 experiences are thus less likely to be associated with effective learning from failure. 
Moderating Impact of the Extent of Failure on the Relationship Between Internal 24
Attribution of Blame and Subsequent Venture Growth 25
While internal attribution of blame allows entrepreneurs to learn effectively, the conditions under 1 which they preserve self-esteem are important for future entrepreneurial endeavors. Too many 2 failures and too much internal blame can reduce an entrepreneur's self-efficacy. Self-efficacy 3 refers to individuals' conscious beliefs in their own abilities to accomplish desirable task 4 performance (Bandura, 1997; Baron, 2004) . Self-efficacy "impacts our perceived control, how 5 much stress, self-blame, and depressions we experience while we cope with taxing circumstances, 6
and the level of accomplishment we realize" (Markman et al., 2002: 151-152) . It also influences 7 our course of action, level of effort, and perseverance (Bandura, 1999) . Scholars in 8 entrepreneurship have further specified the scope of self-efficacy by introducing the concept of 9 entrepreneurial self-efficacy (Forbes, 2005) . Entrepreneurial self-efficacy has been defined in 10 terms of the degree to which individuals believe they are capable of performing the roles and 11 tasks associated with pursuing an entrepreneurial career, starting businesses, and managing and In sum, while we suggest that internal attribution is associated with effective learning and 12 subsequent growth, we predict that, after a certain threshold, too much failure attributed internally 13 may dampen the effectiveness of learning through decreasing entrepreneurial self-efficacy and 14 leading to the buildup of negative emotions (Shepherd & Cardon, 2009 (1) Ventures by entrepreneurs who have experienced a low number of failures, will 22 achieve higher growth with higher levels of internal attribution.
23
(2) Ventures by entrepreneurs who have experienced a high number of failures, will 24 achieve lower growth with higher levels of internal attribution. 25 26 Moderating Impact of the Extent of Failure on the Relationship Between Intrinsic 27
Motivation to Start Up Another Business and Subsequent Venture Growth 28
The knowledge assets gained through failure interacts with the evolving vision of entrepreneurs 1 to create value (Penrose, 1959) . Although entrepreneurs may fail several times, their intrinsic 2 motivation often in the form of passion and persistence for entrepreneurship may keep them 3 going forward (Chen et al., 2009 ). Perseverance, in the shape of greater commitment, can rise 4 even higher. Individuals highly committed to a cause not only prefer more challenging activities, 5 but also display greater staying power in those pursuits (Bandura, 1997) . Winston Churchill, for 6 example, famously said that "Success is the ability to go from failure to failure without losing can be defined as the tendency to overly commit to a failing course of action (Staw, 1997) . This is 13 often associated with an increasing commitment to the same course of action in a sequence of 14 decisions that result in negative outcomes (Karlsson et 
Measures 1
New venture growth. 6 While many studies use a subjective measure on entrepreneurs' behavioral 2 intentions, we use an objective measure to capture new venture growth as our dependent variable. 3
It is measured by the growth rate of employees-the ratio of the increased number of employees 4 (total number of employees at the time of the survey minus the total number of employees at the 5 time of start-up) to the initial number of employees at the time of start-up. More specifically, we 6 measure the increase in size, and divide it by age (in months) to obtain the average growth rate 7 over the venture's life. 0 otherwise (0/3). 7 We acknowledge that essentially, the true cause of failure is difficult to assess 15 (Cardon et al., 2010). Individuals see different aspects of failures (Shaver, 1985) and are also 16 likely to perceive both internal and external attributes of blame for each and every failure. is necessary to assess self-attribution of motivation." We do just that and capture respondents ' 6 self-attribution of their motivation to start up another venture. Just as in coding the attribution of 7 blame, we determine whether or not motivation was primarily intrinsic by weighing what 8 respondents identify as their most critical driver for their entrepreneurial action. 9
Extent of failure. We use the number of failures respondents have experienced prior to starting 10 their current venture to measure the extent of failure experiences. We use this as a more concrete 11 and measurable proxy to operationalize the construct. In addition, to test for a curvilinear 12 (inverted U-shape) interaction effect, we create another variable in square terms. 13
Control variables. 9 We control for four sets of factors to rule out alternative explanations. First, 14
we control for industry effects by creating dummy variables. 10 We also create a dummy variable, 15 domain abandonment, to control for the learning impact of failure-related experience ( Finally, we control for entrepreneurs' orientation for growth (Chandler & Hanks, 1998 ) by 7 creating a dummy variable based on a survey question regarding their aspiration for growth. 8
Models 9
We use robust regression analysis to test our hypotheses (Starbuck, 2005; Zaman et al., 2005) . 10 This in turn will allow us to account for the pull effect of outliers (i.e., high-growth gazelles), and 11 will produce more efficient standard errors than OLS regression. Further, hierarchical and 12 moderated regression models will be utilized. By controlling for main effects, hierarchical 13 regression models enable us to examine the added explanatory variance of each independent 14 variable. In sequence, we enter control variables, main variables, and interaction terms. For additional robustness checks, we use Tobit regression to complement our analysis 20 (Deephouse, 1996) . Past research shows that any censoring problem such as using percentage as a 21 dependent variable would render biased estimates from an OLS-based analysis. While the rate of 22 new venture growth in our sample can take negative terms, having a negative growth rate would 23 suggest a course of failure. Since our data only constitute new ventures that are still alive, we 24 augment our analysis by using the Tobit regression designed to make improved estimates when 1 there are potential censoring issues. Results are qualitatively similar to our main findings. 2 3 Findings 4 Overall, the significance of the moderating influence in Model 5 suggests that the main 3 effect of internal attribution of blame is superseded by the interaction effect. In other words, the 4 result shows that entrepreneurs with higher (as opposed to lower) levels of internal attribution of 5 failure will achieve higher growth when they have experienced a low number of failures, (extent 6 of failure: low), but when the number of failures is high (extent of failure: high), this relationship 7 is reversed-entrepreneurs with higher (as opposed to lower) levels of internal attribution of 8 failure will achieve lower growth. The significant result of the interaction effect is presented in 9 Second, our study also contributes to both the attribution and motivation literatures. We 1 find that attribution influences the effectiveness of the learning process. Specifically, internal 2 attribution, under certain conditions, benefits learning (by signaling the importance of the cause 3 of an event), thereby enables greater performance in the form of new venture growth. We also 4 find that the function of internal attribution of blame is contingent on the extent of failure 5 experiences operationalized by the number of failures (Figures 2 and 3) . In other words, internal 6 attribution of blame can either be positively or negatively associated with subsequent venture 7 growth depending on the extent of failure experiences-in this case, number of previously 8 experienced failures. On the one hand, our findings support the view that internal attribution of 9 blame can lead to greater performance (in the form of new venture growth) when entrepreneurs 10 have experienced low number of failures. On the other hand, it can also lead to negative 11 outcomes when entrepreneurs suffer from a high number of failure experiences. The result of our 12 piecewise analysis also reveals that internal attribution of blame is associated with subsequent 13 organizational growth up until a threshold point. Beyond the threshold point, internal attribution 14 does not guarantee subsequent organizational growth. Overall, we have identified the role that 15 attribution plays behind entrepreneurial activity-and a boundary condition linking attribution 16 and subsequent venture performance. 17
In terms of motivation to start up another business after previous failure, our results reveal 18 that intrinsic motivation indeed leads to greater sustainability and organizational growth. 19 Specifically, entrepreneurs who recover and rebound from failure and are able to start up another 20 venture achieve growth in their subsequent entrepreneurial endeavor when they are driven by 21 intrinsic motivation. While we predicted that there is a threshold beyond which too many failures 22 of intrinsically motivated endeavors dampen the effectiveness of learning (or simply the trap of 23 escalation of commitment to a failing course of action), our findings demonstrate that 24 accumulative intrinsic motivation can result in a strong form of persistence that drives growth. 1
Most importantly, the entire premise of the study has involved the various mechanisms by which 2 entrepreneurs react to failure, and the implications for future growth. We argue that it is critical to 3 combine the effects of the attribution of blame, the motivation to start up again, and the extent of 4 failure expriences in order to better understand the mechanism of recovery from failure that 5 affects the outcome of future entrepreneurship. 6
Third, we empirically substantiate our arguments through a survey-based database of new 7 venture founders with failure experiences-to the best of our knowledge, one of the very first 8 such endeavors in the literature. Rarely do we see empirical research with actual entrepreneurs 9 who have multiple failure experiences. The nature of the survey has allowed us to examine the 10 conditions under which entrepreneurs experience failures, and how their reaction to failure can be 11 applied to predicting their subsequent entrepreneurial endeavors. Our focus on hard outcome (e.g., 12
new venture growth) as opposed to behavioral intentions (e.g., whether they intend to start 13 another venture after the first failure) also adds to our understanding of successful 14 entrepreneurship. We find support not only for predicting the main effects but also for the 15 interaction effects (Figures 2 and 3 ) that reveal interesting boundary conditions linking previous 16 entrepreneurial failure and subsequent venture performance. 17
Overall, our study extends theoretically and empirically the literature on entrepreneurial 18 failure. Even within the "greater risk" and "hostile" environment to entrepreneurship in Japan, 19 people start businesses, fail, but some (but not all) recover under certain conditions we uncover in 20 this study. These entrepreneurs then learn from failure, persist, then go on to start another venture, 21
and ultimately attain success and growth. Given the paucity of entrepreneurship research on 22
Japan (Bruton & Lau, 2008) , a country where entrepreneurship is desperately needed, our efforts 23 have also expanded the global scope of entrepreneurship research on failure and recovery. The 24 greater we understand about the relationship between failure and subsequent venture success, the 1 better it is to understand entrepreneurship, not just in Japan, but in other parts of the world where 2 tolerance of failure is low. 3
Practical Implications 4
On the surface, failure is something to be avoided. We do find that simply a greater amount of 5 failure experiences may not necessarily entail positive influence on subsequent venture 6 performance. In fact, an increasing number of failures can be especially harmful for those who 7 internally attribute their blame, since the larger number of failures will eventually become a 8 burden reducing one's self-efficacy. No matter how entrepreneurs intrinsically motivate 9 themselves to embark upon an entrepreneurial career upon multiple failures, this will not insure 10 greater success in the future. 11
However, our results indicate that revitalizing from failure is indeed possible. In a best-12 case scenario, our findings offer direct practical implications. Specifically, entrepreneurs should 13
(1) avoid blaming it all on the external environment or luck, and instead find some aspect of the 14 failure to attribute internally to facilitate effective learning from failure; (2) be motivated 15 intrinsically, then pursuing intrinsic outcomes will facilitate the performance of the next start-up; 16 and (3) try not to fail too many times (perhaps reconsider your career option when it happens to 17 be the case). While most entrepreneurs are likely to experience some failure, we find that it is 18 their post-failure attitude that may make or break their subsequent endeavors. 19
Limitations and Future Research 20
Among limitations, first, our cross-sectional design limits causal inferences. Despite the 21 diagrammed arrows in Figure 1 , the directionality as well as the appropriate time-lag of the 22 effects remains uncertain. Since the growth of a new venture is an outcome of a process that 23 occurs over time, a longitudinal approach will be more desirable for future research. A dynamic 24 view will also allow us to examine the possible shift in one's attribution and motivation from one 1 failure to another that is not captured in our current study. Exploring the optimal balance (e.g., 2 ambidexterity) between internal/external attribution and intrinsic/extrinsic motivation as well as 3 examining the shift in their composition and the path from one failure to another seems to 4 promise interesting findings. The concept of socially situated cognition would suggest that 5 context matters. The effects of failure, attribution, and motivation may vary depending on the 6 business environment. 7
Second, our data came from a specific institutional context-Japan. While controlling for 8 the context is strength of our design, it unfortunately limits the generalizability of our results 9 (Asaba, 2013; Nakamura, 2011) . One can argue that different cultural norms and inner 10 mechanisms exist that may affect the prospects of entrepreneurs' subsequent endeavors and their 11 future performance in different ways. There may be issues with social desirability bias in 12 respondents' stated causes for failure given the conservative context. For example, cultural value 13 in Japan may encourage more external attribution (e.g., "face-saving") and more continuation 14 despite hardship. Attribution patterns must be evaluated in conjunction with social context 15 because cultural values and norms affect the way individuals make attributions (Hess et al., 1987; 16 Holloway, 1988) . Differences in attribution styles may exist between individualist and collectivist 17 cultures where individuals in collectivist cultures (e.g., Asia, Latin America, Africa) tend to be 18 less susceptible to the fundamental attribution error and to the self-serving bias than those in 19 individualist cultures (e.g., North America, Western Europe) (Li, 2012; Mao, Peng, & Wong, 20 2012 ). These findings suggest that our study may represent a less-error, less-biased effect of 21 cognitive factors. colleagues (2010a, 2010b) have also argued that the Japanese 22 context is perhaps more generalizable than others such as the Western context, because Western 23 societies are among the least representative populations concerning fundamental aspects of 24 psychology, motivation, and behaviors. Either way, future research will benefit from embracing a 1 comparative or cross-country study design drawing on different cultural contexts (Li, 2012) . 2
Third, in the absence of rich qualitative information, our study has all the usual trapping 3 associated with survey research. Future researchers are certainly encouraged to qualitatively 4 explore the complex issues associated with entrepreneurs' recovery from failure. Our sample 5 relies on self-reported data from entrepreneurs who failed but started and survived in their new 6
ventures. In other words, our sample only included previously failed entrepreneurs who managed 7 to come back, and whose new businesses were still surviving at the time of our study. As a result 8 our arguments may not be generalizable to those who exited and never came back to the 9 entrepreneurial game, or those who re-entered but failed and disappeared prior to the 10 administration of the survey. No comparison is thus made between previously failed 11 entrepreneurs who chose not to start another firm with those who did. We understand how 12 invaluable it must be if we could test our arguments on "all" entrepreneurs who failed. Our 13 current sample may pose such potential problems as selection (success) bias, common method 14 bias, and recall-bias (attribution-bias) by respondents. We also recognize the weakness of our 15 measurement (e.g., attribution, motivation)-constrained as a single-item measure. Future 16 research would benefit from utilizing a more robust scale measure of variables derived from the 17 psychology literature, experimental designs, and factor analytical techniques. Furthermore, in 18 terms of the "extent of failure" construct, a measurement of the magnitude of failure instead of a 19 simple number of failures may have captured additional insights to our arguments. Again, a 20 qualitative analysis as an additional element of study such as interviewing Japanese entrepreneurs 21 could have uncovered invaluable insights and provided robustness to both design and findings of 22 our study. 23 We also recognize that entrepreneurial success or failure may not entirely depend on the 1 founders/owners, and that other members of the top management team as well as the larger 2 institutional environment may have played a role (Zhu, Wittman, & Peng, 2012) . This is 3 something that our data do not allow us to explore, but remains an interesting future direction to 4 probe into. Finally, it could be fascinating to study the relationship between causal attributions 5 and "actual" causes and their impact on outcomes. It is not easy to find studies of this nature 6 (Cardon et al., 2010). Perhaps the challenge is that it is hard to assess what actual causes of a 7 failure are since every description or explanation for a failure is a perception or attribution that 8 someone makes, and "truth" is often in the eye of the perceiver (Weick, 1995)-exactly what we 9 have explored in this study. 10 11
Conclusion 12
As a first step toward a better understanding of how entrepreneurs' failure experiences play a key 13 role in determining the growth of their subsequent entrepreneurial endeavors, this study has 14 barely scratched the surface of this entrepreneurial mechanism. Our findings support the view 15 that under certain conditions, previous failures indeed stimulate future entrepreneurial growth. 16 Given the pervasiveness of business failures and the paucity of scholarly research on the link 17 between earlier failure and subsequent entrepreneurship, it seems imperative that our attention be 18 devoted to this important, relevant, and challenging research agenda of how entrepreneurs rise 19 from the ashes to attain future entrepreneurial success. Note. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
